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The effects of a change in market abuse regulation on abnormal returns and volumes: Evidence from the Amsterdam stock market

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  • Bas ter Weel
  • T. Prevoo

Abstract

The Market Abuse Directive came into effect on 1 October 2005. One of its purposes is to reduce illegal insider trading and leakage of information prior to official releases by increasing penalties. This paper investigates the effects of the Market Abuse Directive through an event study approach. The Market Abuse Directive came into effect on 1 October 2005. One of its purposes is to reduce illegal insider trading and leakage of information prior to official releases by increasing penalties. This paper investigates the effects of the Market Abuse Directive through an event study approach. Using a dataset of almost 5,000 corporate news announcements, the analysis reveals that the information value of announcements, measured by the announcement day abnormal return and abnormal volume, is not significantly different after the new regulation than it was before although the number of releases has increased significantly. Trading suspicious of illegal insider trading and leakage of information, measured in terms of cumulative average abnormal returns and volumes for the 30 days prior to the news announcement, has significantly declined for small capitalization firms, for announcements containing information about alliances and mergers and acquisitions and for firms in the technology sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Bas ter Weel & T. Prevoo, 2010. "The effects of a change in market abuse regulation on abnormal returns and volumes: Evidence from the Amsterdam stock market," CPB Discussion Paper 154, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:154
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sanders, Ralph W. & Zdanowicz, John S., 1992. "Target Firm Abnormal Returns and Trading Volume around the Initiation of Change in Control Transactions," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(1), pages 109-129, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cowan, Arnold R. & Salotti, Valentina, 2020. "Anti-selective disclosure regulation and analyst forecast accuracy and usefulness," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Parul Bhatia & Lipika Jain, 2025. "Lawful Sequence of Events and Cryptocurrency Anomalies: An Empirical Investigation," FIIB Business Review, , vol. 14(1), pages 71-88, January.
    3. Riccardo Ferretti & Pierpaolo Pattitoni & Roberto Patuelli, 2021. "Insider Trading and the Market Abuse Directive: Are Voluntary and Mandatory Takeover Bids Different?," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 7(3), pages 461-485, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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