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Equilibrium in secure strategies

Author

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  • iskakov, Mikhail

    (Institute of Control Sciences RAS, Moscow)

  • ISKAKOV, Alexey

    (Institute of Control Sciences RAS, Moscow)

Abstract

A new concept of equilibrium in secure strategies (EinSS) in non-cooperative games is presented. The EinSS coincides with the Nash-Cournot Equilibrium when Nash-Cournot Equilibrium exists and postulates the incentive of players to maximize their profit under the condition of security against actions of other players. The new concept is illustrated by a number of matrix game examples and compared with other closely related theoretical models. We prove the existence of equilibrium in secure strategies in four classic games that fail to have Nash-Cournot equilibria. On an infinite line we obtain the solution in secure strategies of the classic Hotelling’s price game (1929) with a restricted reservation price and linear transportation costs. New type of monopolistic solution in secure strategies is discovered in the Tullock Contest (1967, 1980) of two players. For the model of insurance market we prove that the contract pair found by Rothschild, Stiglitz and Wilson (1976) is always an equilibrium in secure strategies. We characterize all equilibria in secure prices in the Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly model with capacity constraints.

Suggested Citation

  • iskakov, Mikhail & ISKAKOV, Alexey, 2012. "Equilibrium in secure strategies," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2012061, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2012061
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Iskakov, Mikhail & Iskakov, Alexey, 2012. "Solution of the Hotelling’s game in secure strategies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 115-118.
    6. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Iskakov, A. & Iskakov, M., 2017. "In Search of a Generalized Concept of Rationality," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 181-189.
    2. Iskakov, M., 2022. "Existence theorems for Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 56(4), pages 12-27.
    3. Aleskerov, F., 2013. "Game-Theoretic Modeling: An Attempt of Brief Discussion and a Forecast of Development," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 181-184.
    4. Marina S. Sandomirskaia, 2015. "Price-Quantity Competition of Farsighted Firms: Toughness vs. Collusion," HSE Working papers WP BRP 93/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    5. ISKAKOV, Mikhail & ISKAKOV, Alexey & ZAKHAROV, Alexey, 2014. "Equilibria in secure strategies in the Tullock contest," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Sergey Kokovin & Babu Nahata & Evgeny Zhelobodko, 2014. "Distortion in Screening and Spatial Preferences," HSE Working papers WP BRP 83/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    equilibrium in secure strategies; Hotelling model; Tullock contest; insurance market; Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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