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Screening Multiple Uninformed Experts

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  • Francisco Barreras

Abstract

Testing the validity of claims made by self-proclaimed experts can be impossible when testing them in isolation, even with infinite observations at the disposal of the tester. However, in a multiple expert setting it’s possible to design a contract that only informed experts accept and uninformed experts reject. The tester can pit competing theories against each other and take advantage of the uncertainty experts have about the other experts’ type. This contract will work even when there is only a single data point to evaluate.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Barreras, 2017. "Screening Multiple Uninformed Experts," Documentos de Trabajo 15282, Quantil.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000508:015282
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein, 2008. "Comparative Testing of Experts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 541-559, May.
    2. Wojciech Olszewski & Alvaro Sandroni, 2006. "Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 1425, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    3. Alvaro Sandroni, 2014. "At Least Do No Harm: The Use of Scarce Data," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 1-3, February.
    4. , & ,, 2007. "Contracts and uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 1-13, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Self-proclaimed; isolation; Uninformed Experts; uncertainty;
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