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Autonomia De La Banca Central E Inflacion La Experiencia Colombiana, 1923-1995

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  • Adolfo Meisel R.

Abstract

Con el aumento generalizado en los niveles de inflación a partir de la culminación en 1973 del acuerdo de Bretton Woods, en la cual las tasas de cambio fijas servían como "anclas nominales" del régimen monetario, se han venido presentando diferentes alternativas para tratar de garantizar la estabilidad en el nivel de precios. Una de las primeras propuestas para lograr estabilizar los precios fue la Milton Friedman, quien sostuvo que ello se podía lograr si los bancos centrales seguía una política monetaria determinada por una regla de crecimiento fija y pre-anunciada. Sin embargo, se puede demostrar que en general no resulta óptimo que el banco central siempre se ajuste a una regla fija, ya que elimina su capacidad para responder a perturbaciones no-anticipadas, especialmente los choques de oferta (1). Una propuesta mucho más radical para lograr la estabilidad en los precios es la de F.A. Hayek de 1976 (2). El argumento de este autor es que con la desnacionalización del dinero se puede lograr estabilidad en los precios. El sistema que propuso fue uno de competencia en la emisión privada del papel moneda inconvertible. Los bancos emisores tendrían el incentivo de obtener fondos libres de interés al inducir a los consumidores a poseer sus billetes. Es lo que se conoce en la literatura como un régimen de banca libre. Como resultado de esta propuesta "excéntrica", se despertó un enorme interés académico por el tema de la banca libre, un tipo de organización bancaria que existió en muchos países antes que se consolidara el esquema de los bancos únicos para emisión de billetes. En la banca libre no hay barreras a la entrada del negocio bancario y no hay control central de las reservas (3). (1) Al respecto véase Kenneth Rogoff, "The Optimal Degree of Comittment to an intermediate Monetary Target", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.2, #4, Nov.1985. (2) F.A.Hayek, The Denationalization of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of concurrent currencies, London institute of Economic Affairs, Great Britain, 1976. (3) Kurt Schuler, The World History of Free Banking, An Overview, en Kevin Dowd (editor), The Experience of Free Banking, Routledge, Great Britain, 1992, p.8.

Suggested Citation

  • Adolfo Meisel R., 1996. "Autonomia De La Banca Central E Inflacion La Experiencia Colombiana, 1923-1995," Borradores de Economia 2035, Banco de la Republica.
    • Handle: RePEc:col:000094:002035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 6(3), pages 353-398, September.
    3. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Rockoff, Hugh, 1974. "The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(2), pages 141-167, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Juan C. Jaramillo & Roberto Steiner & Natalia Salazar, 1999. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Colombia," Research Department Publications 3064, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Mejía Cubillos, Javier, 2012. "Propuesta metodológica para el cálculo del riesgo sistémico financiero en estudios de Historia Económica: Aplicación para el caso de la banca libre en Antioquia, 1888 [A methodology for assessing f," MPRA Paper 35460, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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