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How Important are Dismissals in CEO Incentives? Evidence from a Dynamic Agency Model

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Abstract

I estimate a dynamic agency model to quantify the importance of dismissals in CEO incentives vis-à-vis pecuniary compensation. The model features endogenous dynamics in deferred and ow compensation, as well as exogenous departures, and endogenous dismissals after poor firm performance. Thus, the model functions as a classification device for CEO turnover events that exploits information from all the departures in the data. I estimate the model via the Simulated Method of Moments, using data for CEOs in U.S. public firms appointed from 1993 to 2013. The estimated CEO dismissal rate is 1.2 percent, and the CEO replacement cost represents 3.4 percent of firm assets, 64 million in 2015 U.S. dollars for the median firm. Poor governance, proxied by director independence, increases the replacement costs in big firms. The relationship reverses in small firms, so board independence must also capture better hiring policies or career concerns of directors. The results confirm that CEO dismissals are infrequent. However, changes in the cost of replacements that generate small increases in the underlying dismissal rate lead to substantial reductions in the size of incentive compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Alvaro Remesal, 2018. "How Important are Dismissals in CEO Incentives? Evidence from a Dynamic Agency Model," Working Papers wp2018_1809, CEMFI.
  • Handle: RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2018_1809
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    1. Pakes, Ariel & Pollard, David, 1989. "Simulation and the Asymptotics of Optimization Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1027-1057, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gian Luca Clementi & Thomas Cooley, 2023. "CEO Compensation: Facts," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 50, pages 6-27, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Executives; CEO turnover; CEO compensation; governance; dismissal; SMM.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs

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