Information Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk
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Cited by:
- Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004.
- Kartik, Navin, 2007. "A note on cheap talk and burned money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 749-758, September.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008.
"Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2007. "Language, meaning and games: a model of communication, coordination and evolution," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 61, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Stefano Demichelis & Jörgen Weibull, 2009. "Language, meaning and games A model of communication, coordination and evolution," Working Papers hal-00354224, HAL.
- Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2010.
"Persuasion by Cheap Talk,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2361-2382, December.
- Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009.
- Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2019. "Efficient coordination in the lab," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 14(1), pages 175-201, March.
- Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, 2006. "A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 425-442, October.
- Giovannoni, Francesco & Seidmann, Daniel J., 2007. "Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 296-315, May.
- Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Marc Vorsatz, 2009.
"Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 220-241, June.
- Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2007. "Enjoy the Silence: An Experiment on Truth-Telling," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 155, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Crawford, Vincent P., 2017.
"Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level-k thinking,"
Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 20-31.
- Vincent P Crawford, 2007. "Let’s Talk It Over: Coordination Via Preplay Communication With Level-k Thinking," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001449, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Crawford, Vincent P, 2017. "Let׳s talk it over: Coordination via preplay communication with level-k thinking," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0gf0w872, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Kartik, Navin & Ottaviani, Marco & Squintani, Francesco, 2007. "Credulity, lies, and costly talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 93-116, May.
- Matteo Triossi, 2006. "Reliability and Responsibility: A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 21, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- , & , J. & ,, 2007.
"Noisy talk,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(4), December.
- Andreas Blume & Oliver Board & Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Noisy Talk," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 167, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Sjaak Hurkens & Navin Kartik, 2006. "(When) Would I Lie To You? Comment on ?Deception: The Role of Consequences?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 664.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
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