Author
Listed:
- Ruth Dupré
- Patrick Joly
- Michel Patry
Abstract
For many, Quebec government intervention in hydroelecticity began in 1963 with the nationalization of the industry. In fact, this was the last stage of a progression in policy whose beginnings can be traced back to the Quebec Electricity Commission in 1935. Was this commission effective or was it just a window dressing exercise by the government in order to calm down political agitation ? To answer this question, two types of tests are used. First, we conduct an event study analysis of the expected effect of regulation on the stock market prices of utilities. Second, we examine the effect regulation has had on the evolution of rates in Quebec. Both approaches point towards ineffectiveness. The political economy model explains why. The political struggle was quite unequal. The consumers, numerous but mostly unorganized, were not united because of the large gap between domestic and industrial rates and were disadvantaged by the inequalities of the electoral map. They were fighting a small and tight group of power companies with large financial means and close relationships with the government. Pour plusieurs, la nationalisation des compagnies d'électricité de 1963 marque le début de l'intervention du gouvernement québécois dans le domaine de l'électicité. Une des actions les plus notoires de la Révolution tranquille, la nationalisation de 1963, n'était que la dernière étape d'une évolution qui remonte aux années trente avec la mise sur pied d'une agence de réglementation, la Commission de l'électricité du Québec. On peut se poser la question si cette Commission a réellement réglementé l'électricité ou si elle était juste un moyen de calmer l'opinion publique. Nous répondons à cette question en mesurant l'impact de la Commission de deux façons. L'effet anticipé de la réglementation sur le prix des actions des compagnies d'électricité est estimé au moyen d'une étude évènementielle. L'effet actuel sur les tarifs d'électricité est évalué en les comparant à ceux de l'Ontario. Les deux approches suggèrent que la Commission a été plutôt inefficace. Le modèle de marché politique explique pourquoi. La lutte était très inégale. Les consommateurs, nombreux0501s inorganisés, ne faisaient pas front commun à cause du grand écart entre les tarifs domestiques et industriels. Ils se retrouvaient de plus défavorisés par les inégalités de la carte électorale. Ils faisaient face à un petit groupe d'entreprises avec de fortes interrelations, de grands moyens financiers et des liens serrés avec le gouvernement.
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