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Government Size, Trade Openness, and Output Volatility: A Case of Fully Integrated Economies

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  • Eiji Fujii

Abstract

Government is often considered the safe sector of an open economy that provides households with insurance against external risk exposure. Among highly integrated economies, however, households should be able to exploit common financial markets to insure themselves. In this paper we examine the relationship between government size, trade openness, and output volatility across fully integrated economies using Japan’s regional income accounting and public finance data. The contributions of the government- and market-based insurances to inter-regional risk sharing are also estimated. The empirical results reveal some unique aspects of the state-market interactions under full economic integration with vertical fiscal imbalance.

Suggested Citation

  • Eiji Fujii, 2015. "Government Size, Trade Openness, and Output Volatility: A Case of Fully Integrated Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 5563, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_5563
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    Cited by:

    1. Erauskin, Iñaki & Turnovsky, Stephen J., 2020. "Financial globalization and its consequences for productive government expenditure," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    2. Dong-Hyeon Kim & Yu-Bo Suen & Shu-Chin Lin & Joyce Hsieh, 2018. "Government size, government debt and globalization," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(25), pages 2792-2803, May.
    3. Ahmet Tekin & İbrahim Tuğrul Çınar & Ersin Nail Sağdıç & Fazlı Yıldız, 2023. "Trade Openness and Sustainable Government Size: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(15), pages 1-17, August.
    4. Iñaki Erauskin & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 2019. "Financial Globalization and the Increase in the Size of Government: Are They Related?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 219-253, April.
    5. Kwame Mireku & Ellen Animah Agyei & Daniel Domeher, 2017. "Trade openness and economic growth volatility: An empirical investigation," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(1), pages 1385438-138, January.
    6. Erkam Sari & Hakan Hotunluoglu, 2021. "Government Size and Openness: Insights Basedon Country Classifications," World Journal of Applied Economics, WERI-World Economic Research Institute, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    government size; output volatility; risk-sharing; trade openness; vertical fiscal imbalance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • F40 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - General

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