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Towards Behavioral Political Economy of Institutional Change: With Field Facts from China

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  • Yongjing Zhang
  • Mei Wang

Abstract

This study proposes an analytical framework towards behavioral political economy of institutional change. It considers institutional changes as central government’s choices under uncertainty, which are largely driven by the strategic outcomes in a behavioral coordination game between local officials and private businessmen. With field facts in China, this study suggests that institutional changes begin with pro-competition policies, then a better protection of property rights, followed by a possible standstill or even worse rule of law.

Suggested Citation

  • Yongjing Zhang & Mei Wang, 2014. "Towards Behavioral Political Economy of Institutional Change: With Field Facts from China," CESifo Working Paper Series 4956, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4956
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    behavioral economics; China; institutional change; political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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