Of Morals, Markets and Mice: A Comment on Falk and Szech
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- Bernd Irlenbusch & David J. Saxler, 2015. "Social responsibility in market interaction," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 06-05, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences.
- Megan V. Teague & Virgil Henry Storr & Rosemarie Fike, 2020. "Economic freedom and materialism: an empirical analysis," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 1-44, March.
- Irlenbusch, Bernd & Saxler, David, 2015. "Social Responsibility in Market Interaction," IZA Discussion Papers 9240, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Hannes Rusch, 2015. "Do Bankers Have Deviant Moral Attitudes? ?Negative Results from a Tentative Survey," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 6(92), January.
- Michael P. Schlaile & Katharina Klein & Wolfgang Böck, 2018. "From Bounded Morality to Consumer Social Responsibility: A Transdisciplinary Approach to Socially Responsible Consumption and Its Obstacles," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 561-588, May.
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JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
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