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Supporting Ukraine Militarily: Why Is the West Divided?

Author

Listed:
  • Vesa Kanniainen
  • Juha-Matti Lehtonen

Abstract

Following Russia’s attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Western countries have been providing military assistance to Ukraine. However, relative to GDP, the support from the small Baltic and Nordic countries has been greater than that of the larger European NATO countries. This article introduces first an alliance model to examine the incentive for alliance member countries to invest in their own national security in a deterrence equilibrium with no warfare. It is shown that an underinvestment incentive arises. The Russian invasion to Ukraine changed the rules of the game. Therefore, the article offers an explanation for the distribution of Ukrainian military assistance based on the national security classification of European NATO member states in a two-stage game-theoretic model. This distribution turns out to be conditional on the expectations associated with the second stage of the war game if Russia wins the war in its first stage and if there is uncertainty about NATO's ability to commit to its Article 5 to provide security to all of its members.

Suggested Citation

  • Vesa Kanniainen & Juha-Matti Lehtonen, 2025. "Supporting Ukraine Militarily: Why Is the West Divided?," CESifo Working Paper Series 11609, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11609
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp11609.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vesa Kanniainen & Staffan Ringbom, 2017. "The Option Value of Membership in a Defense Alliance," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 73(4), pages 382-401, December.
    2. Vesa Kanniainen, 2018. "Corrigendum to: Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(4), pages 729-729.
    3. Vesa Kanniainen, 2018. "Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 64(4), pages 617-638.
    4. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    military aid to Ukraine; alliance theory; NATO; two-stage game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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