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Best-shot network games with continuous action space

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  • Ghosh, Papiya
  • Kundu, Rajendra P.

Abstract

This paper presents a model of public good provision in networks where the level of public good that an agent has access to depends on the maximum of contributions by the agents in her neighbourhood. Our analysis shows that the game always has an equilibrium in pure strategies and all equilibria are specialised and stable. Welfare analysis shows that formation of new links in a prevailing network may not always be useful.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghosh, Papiya & Kundu, Rajendra P., 2019. "Best-shot network games with continuous action space," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 225-234.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:73:y:2019:i:3:p:225-234
    DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2019.07.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, September.
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    3. Harrison, Glenn W & Hirshleifer, Jack, 1989. "An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot Models of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 201-225, February.
    4. Boncinelli, Leonardo & Pin, Paolo, 2012. "Stochastic stability in best shot network games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 538-554.
    5. Yann Bramoull? & Rachel Kranton & Martin D'Amours, 2014. "Strategic Interaction and Networks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(3), pages 898-930, March.
    6. Jack Hirshleifer, 1983. "From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 371-386, January.
    7. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    8. Basu, Kaushik & Foster, James E, 1998. "On Measuring Literacy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(451), pages 1733-1749, November.
    9. Yann Bramoulle & Rachel Kranton, 2005. "Strategic Experimentation in Networks," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 784828000000000417, www.najecon.org.
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    11. Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Public goods in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 478-494, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jin, Xing & Tao, Yuchen & Wang, Jingrui & Wang, Chao & Wang, Yongheng & Zhang, Zhouyang & Wang, Zhen, 2023. "Strategic use of payoff information in k-hop evolutionary Best-shot networked public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 459(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Innovation; Network; Maximal independent set; Nash tatonnement; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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