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A Better Cycle-Breaker for Swiss Democracy?

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Gersbach
  • Rodrigo Casado Noguerales
  • Samuel Schenk

Abstract

When a counter-proposal is made to an initiative to change the Swiss constitution, the citizenry makes three binary majority choices: the initiative versus the status quo, the initiative versus the counter-proposal, and the status quo versus the counterproposal as a tie-breaker. If there is a cycle, the alternative that beats the status-quo wins. This system invites strategic voting, as exemplified by the 2010 case of the “Ausschaffungsinitiative”. We suggest to break cycles differently by choosing the middle alternative in case of a cycle, which will normally be the counter-proposal. More precisely, we show that there always exists a strong Nash equilibrium in which all citizens vote sincerely. Moreover, the outcome of all alternative strong equilibria with strategic voting is the same as if everybody votes sincerely. We also show that other common cycle-breaker rules cannot achieve the same result.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach & Rodrigo Casado Noguerales & Samuel Schenk, 2024. "A Better Cycle-Breaker for Swiss Democracy?," CESifo Working Paper Series 11265, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11265
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Swiss democracy; three-way referendum; Condorcet Winner; manipulation; information sharing; initiative;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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