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Responses to More Severe Punishment in the Courtroom: Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing Laws

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  • Fusako Tsuchimoto
  • Libor Dusek

Abstract

We investigate behavioral responses of judges and prosecutors to more severe punishments by analyzing the effects of Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) laws in a large sample of individual criminal cases. The TIS laws raised effective punishment by requiring offenders to serve at least 85% of their imposed sentence in prison. Differences between the U.S. states in the timing of adoption and the types of crimes covered provide a source of identification. The key findings are: (1) The TIS laws reduced the probability that an arrested offender is eventually convicted by 25% through an increase in the probability that the case is dismissed, a reduction in the probability that the defendant pleads guilty, and a reduction in the probability that the defendant is convicted at trial. (2) The TIS laws the reduced the imposed sentence that a defendant may expect upon arrest by 14%. The behavioral responses are empirically important to partially mitigate the intended deterrent effect of the TIS laws.

Suggested Citation

  • Fusako Tsuchimoto & Libor Dusek, 2009. "Responses to More Severe Punishment in the Courtroom: Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing Laws," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp403, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    • Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp403
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emily G. Owens, 2011. "Truthiness in Punishment: The Far Reach of Truth‐in‐Sentencing Laws in State Courts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(s1), pages 239-261, December.
    2. Ross, Amanda, 2012. "Crime, police, and truth-in-sentencing: The impact of state sentencing policy on local communities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 144-152.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Criminal procedure; criminal law; sentencing; Truth-in-Sentencing laws.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law

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