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Mergers in Fiscal Federalism

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  • Marie-Laure Breuillé
  • Skerdilajda Zanaj

Abstract

This paper analyzes mergers of regions in a two-tier setting with both horizontal and vertical tax competition. The merger of regions induces three effects on regional and local tax policies, which are transmitted both horizontally and vertically: i) an alleviation of tax competition at the regional level, ii) a rise in the regional tax base, and iii) a larger internalization of tax externalities generated by cities. It is shown that the merger of regions increases regional tax rates while decreasing local tax rates. This Nash equilibrium with mergers is then compared with the Nash equilibrium with coalitions of regions.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Laure Breuillé & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2010. "Mergers in Fiscal Federalism," INRA UMR CESAER Working Papers 2010/6, INRA UMR CESAER, Centre d'’Economie et Sociologie appliquées à l'’Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux.
    • Handle: RePEc:ceo:wpaper:24
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Mergers and tax competition
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2010-11-19 21:05:00

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    Cited by:

    1. Agrawal, David R., 2016. "Local fiscal competition: An application to sales taxation with multiple federations," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 122-138.
    2. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2023. "Citizen preferences and the architecture of government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 537-585, October.
    3. Bhattarai, Keshab, 2015. "Constitution, Institutions and A Model for Economic Development in Nepal," MPRA Paper 93261, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Apr 2019.
    4. Siggelkow, Benjamin Florian, 2018. "Tax competition and the implications of national tax policy coordination in the presence of fiscal federalism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 17-29.
    5. Lionel WILNER, 2020. "How do citizens perceive centralization reforms? Evidence from the merger of French regions," Working Papers 2020-20, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, revised 07 Jun 2021.
    6. Brülhart, Marius & Bucovetsky, Sam & Schmidheiny, Kurt, 2015. "Taxes in Cities," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 1123-1196, Elsevier.
    7. Jiancai Pi & Kaiqi Zhang & Xiangyu Huang, 2023. "Financial globalization and wage inequality," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 70(2), pages 144-157, May.
    8. David R. Agrawal & Jan K. Brueckner & Marius Brülhart, 2024. "Fiscal Federalism in the 21st Century," CESifo Working Paper Series 10951, CESifo.
    9. Tamai, Toshiki, 2022. "Tax competition versus tax coordination in a multi-region endogenous growth model with an integrated capital market," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mergers; Tax Competition; Fiscal Federalism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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