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The Existence of Informationally Efficient Markets When Individuals Are Rational

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  • Muendler, Marc-Andreas

Abstract

A rational-expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing asset price-contrary to a wide-held conjecture. Generalizing the common additive signal-return model with CARA utility to the family of distributions with moment generating functions, this paper shows that individual investors en- dowed with an average portfolio demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size. More information diminishes the ex- pected excess return of a risky asset so that investors who only have a choice of portfolio composition or whose asset endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off. Under fully revealing price, information market equilibria both with and without informa- tion acquisition are Pareto efficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Muendler, Marc-Andreas, 2004. "The Existence of Informationally Efficient Markets When Individuals Are Rational," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5tf543q2, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt5tf543q2
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    Cited by:

    1. Muendler, Marc-Andreas, 2005. "Rational Information Choice in Financial Market Equilibrium," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5q4764nj, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information Acquisition; Information and Market efficiency; Asymmetric;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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