IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdl/indrel/qt7cq715wp.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Reinventing Disability Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Levine, David I.

Abstract

The disability system in the United States spends approximately $120 billion a year to keep millions of working-aged people on poverty-level stipends while essentially banning them from working. A reinvented system would focus on moving people from dependence to independence with flexible vocational rehabilitation vouchers, work-oriented assessments, and simple rules that guarantee that nobody would ever be made worse off by working. A problem with creating a system that combines work and partial disability benefits is that it may attract new entrants onto the disability rolls. A key insight of this proposal is that these generous work incentives can be tested on the current six million working-age recipients without inducing entry that raises costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Levine, David I., 1997. "Reinventing Disability Policy," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt7cq715wp, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt7cq715wp
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7cq715wp.pdf;origin=repeccitec
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bound, John, 1989. "The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 482-503, June.
    2. Carolyn L. Weaver, 1991. "Disability and Work: Incentives, Rights, and Opportunities," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 917962, September.
    3. H. Hoynes & R. Moffitt, "undated". "The effectiveness of financial work incentives in DI and SSI: Lessons from other transfer programs," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1073-95, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
    4. Jonathan S. Leonard, 1985. "Labor Supply Incentives and Disincentives for the Disabled," NBER Working Papers 1744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter Diamond & Jonathan Gruber, 1997. "Social Security and Retirement in the U.S," NBER Working Papers 6097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. John Bound & Timothy Waidmann, 2000. "Accounting for Recent Declines in Employment Rates among the Working-Aged Disabled," NBER Working Papers 7975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Hoynes, Hilary Williamson & Moffitt, Robert, 1999. "Tax Rates and Work Incentives in the Social Security Disability Insurance Program: Current Law and Alternative Reforms," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(4), pages 623-654, December.
    4. Burkhauser, Richard V. & Butler, J. S. & Gumus, Gulcin, 2003. "Dynamic Modeling of the SSDI Application Timing Decision: The Importance of Policy Variables," IZA Discussion Papers 942, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pc:p:3417-3528 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. R. Haveman & K. Holden & B. Wolfe & P. Smith & K. Wilson, "undated". "The Changing Economic Status of U.S. Disabled Men: Trends and Their Determinants, 1982–1991," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1190-99, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
    7. Owen O'Donnell, 1998. "The Effect of Disability on Employment Allowing for Work Incapacity," Studies in Economics 9813, School of Economics, University of Kent.
    8. Gruber, Jonathan & Madrian, Brigitte C, 1995. "Health-Insurance Availability and the Retirement Decision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 938-948, September.
    9. Amanda Gosling & Eirini‐Christina Saloniki, 2014. "Correction Of Misclassification Error In Disability Rates," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(9), pages 1084-1097, September.
    10. Iskhakov, Fedor, 2008. "Dynamic Programming Model of Health and Retirement," Memorandum 03/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, 2001. "Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 915-957, October.
    12. Cremer Helmuth & Lozachmeur Jean-Marie & Pestieau Pierre, 2007. "Disability Testing and Retirement," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-34, February.
    13. Daniela Andrén, 2008. "First Exits from the Swedish Labor Market Due to Disability," Population Research and Policy Review, Springer;Southern Demographic Association (SDA), vol. 27(2), pages 227-238, April.
    14. Andreas Ravndal Kostol & Magne Mogstad, 2014. "How Financial Incentives Induce Disability Insurance Recipients to Return to Work," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(2), pages 624-655, February.
    15. Gustavo Leal Fernandez, 1991. "Sozialversicherungssysteme jenseits der Industriestaaten. Ein Rahmen für die Sozialpolitik in den neunziger Jahren (Berichte und Dokumente)," Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft - WuG, Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte für Wien, Abteilung Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Statistik, vol. 17(1), pages 85-94.
    16. Koning Pierre & Vethaak Heike, 2021. "Decomposing Employment Trends of Disabled Workers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(4), pages 1217-1255, October.
    17. Brian Bell & James Smith, 2004. "Health, disability insurance and labour force participation," Bank of England working papers 218, Bank of England.
    18. Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, 2004. "Minimum Hours Constraints, Job Requirements and Retirement," NBER Working Papers 10876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Garcia-Gomez, Pilar & Gielen, Anne C., 2014. "Health Effects of Containing Moral Hazard: Evidence from Disability Insurance Reform," IZA Discussion Papers 8386, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Desmet, Raphaël & Jousten, Alain & Perelman, Sergio, 2005. "The Benefits of Separating Early Retirees from the Unemployed: Simulation Results for Belgian Wage Earners," IZA Discussion Papers 1571, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    21. Seibold, Arthur & Seitz, Sebastian & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2022. "Privatizing Disability Insurance," CEPR Discussion Papers 17568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disability; Vocational Rehabilitation;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt7cq715wp. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lisa Schiff (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/irucbus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.