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Do All Markets Ultimately Tip? Experimental Evidence

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  • Morgan, John
  • Hossain, Tanjim
  • Minor, Dylan

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  • Morgan, John & Hossain, Tanjim & Minor, Dylan, 2009. "Do All Markets Ultimately Tip? Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4nw230qt, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt4nw230qt
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    2. Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1249-1278.
    3. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-233, March.
    4. Eric K. Clemons & Bruce W. Weber, 1996. "Alternative Securities Trading Systems: Tests and Regulatory Implications of the Adoption of Technology," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(2), pages 163-188, June.
    5. Caillaud, Bernard & Jullien, Bruno, 2003. "Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 309-328, Summer.
    6. Cantillon, Estelle & Yin, Pai-Ling, 2008. "Competition between Exchanges: Lessons from the Battle of the Bund," CEPR Discussion Papers 6923, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. John B. Van Huyck & Raymond C. Battalio & Richard O. Beil, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(3), pages 885-910.
    8. Mark Armstrong Author-Email: mark.armstrong@ucl.ac.uk Author-Workplace-Name: University College of London, 2006. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, Autumn.
    9. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tanjim Hossain & John Morgan, 2009. "The Quest for QWERTY," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 435-440, May.

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