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Resource mobility, diversification of ownership, and political rent- seeking incentives

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  • Gray, Richard
  • Foster, William E
  • Rausser, Gordon C.

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  • Gray, Richard & Foster, William E & Rausser, Gordon C., 1991. "Resource mobility, diversification of ownership, and political rent- seeking incentives," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt9wt453dn, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt9wt453dn
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1985. "Tariffs as Insurance: Optimal Commercial Policy When Domestic Markets Are Incomplete," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 18(2), pages 258-272, May.
    2. Mussa, Michael, 1982. "Imperfect factor mobility and the distribution of income," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1-2), pages 125-141, February.
    3. Wolfgang F. Stolper & Paul A. Samuelson, 1941. "Protection and Real Wages," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 9(1), pages 58-73.
    4. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-985, December.
    5. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-837, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Beghin, John C. & Fafchamps, M., 1995. "Constitution, Institutions, and the Political Economy of Farm Policies. What Empirical Content?," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1620, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.

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