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The Dynamic Annihilation of a Rational Competitive Fringe by a Low-cost Dominant Firm

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  • Berck, Peter
  • Perloff, Jeffrey M

Abstract

A low-cost dominant firm will drive all competitive fringe firms out of the market if all firms have rational expectations; however, the dominant firm will not predate (price below marginal cost). Since a dominant firm will not drive out fringe firms if they have myopic expectations it may be in the dominant firm's best interests to inform the fringe. The effects of governmental intervention on the optimal path and welfare are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Berck, Peter & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1987. "The Dynamic Annihilation of a Rational Competitive Fringe by a Low-cost Dominant Firm," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt6926m79z, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt6926m79z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kamien, Morton I & Schwartz, Nancy L, 1971. "Limit Pricing and Uncertain Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(3), pages 441-454, May.
    2. Therese Flaherty, M., 1980. "Dynamic limit pricing, barriers to entry, and rational firms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 160-182, October.
    3. Gaskins, Darius Jr., 1971. "Dynamic limit pricing: Optimal pricing under threat of entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 306-322, September.
    4. De Bondt, Raymond R, 1976. "Limit Pricing, Uncertain Entry, and the Entry Lag," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(5), pages 939-946, September.
    5. Baron, David P, 1973. "Limit Pricing, Potential Entry, and Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(4), pages 666-674, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Semmler, Willi & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Minooei Fard, Behnaz & Braga, Joao Paulo, 2022. "Limit pricing and entry game of renewable energy firms into the energy sector," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 179-190.
    2. Flavio Toxvaerd, 2017. "Dynamic limit pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 48(1), pages 281-306, March.
    3. Holmes, Thomas J., 1996. "Can consumers benefit from a policy limiting the market share of a dominant firm?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 365-387, May.
    4. Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1991. "Econometric analysis of imperfect competition and implications for trade research," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt46w1j22d, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    5. Ashiya, Masahiro, 2000. "Weak entrants are welcome," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 975-984, August.
    6. Behnaz Minooei Fard & Willi Semmler & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2023. "Rare Earth Elements: A game between China and the rest of the world," Working Papers in Public Economics 235, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
    7. Emin M. Dinlersoz, 2004. "Firm Organization and the Structure of Retail Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 207-240, June.
    8. Susanne Wied-Nebbeling, 2007. "Fringe firms: Are they better off in a heterogeneous market?," Working Paper Series in Economics 31, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    9. Emin M. Dinlersoz, 2000. "Firm Organization and Retail Industry Dynamics," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0005, Econometric Society.
    10. Colucci, Domenico & Doni, Nicola & Ricchiuti, Giorgio & Valori, Vincenzo, 2022. "Market dynamics with a state-owned dominant firm and a competitive fringe," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).

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