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Appropriate Institutions? Traditional Governance and Public Goods Provision in Oaxaca, Mexico

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  • Bobonis, Gustavo J
  • Chaparro, Juan C
  • Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco
  • Rubio-Codina, Marta

Abstract

What are the consequences of the adoption of traditional governance institutions among indigenous groups for local government affairs? We study the 1995 Usos y Costumbres traditional governance reform in the state of Oaxaca, which legitimized these structures in a subset of its municipalities. We show that the degree of ethnolinguistic polarization between residents of outlying communities and residents of municipal capitals is an important barrier to the former's political representation in local elections. In terms of public goods provision, villages of ethnic minorities are less likely to gain electric service but more likely to gain sewerage services and public schooling.

Suggested Citation

  • Bobonis, Gustavo J & Chaparro, Juan C & Gonzalez-Navarro, Marco & Rubio-Codina, Marta, 2021. "Appropriate Institutions? Traditional Governance and Public Goods Provision in Oaxaca, Mexico," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt56g5737g, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    • Handle: RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt56g5737g
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robin Burgess & Remi Jedwab & Edward Miguel & Ameet Morjaria & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1817-1851, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Peace; Justice and Strong Institutions;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
    • O15 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure

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