A dual formulation of bidding behaviour in sealed bid auctions
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Lebrun, Bernard, 1998. "Comparative Statics in First Price Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 97-110, October.
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More about this item
Keywords
first-price auction; second-price auction; mean winning probability; bidding behaviour; duality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DES-2024-06-24 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2024-06-24 (Game Theory)
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