Competition and dynamics of takeover contests
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References listed on IDEAS
- Betton, Sandra & Eckbo, B Espen, 2000. "Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 13(4), pages 841-882.
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More about this item
Keywords
takeover negotiations; auctions; bargaining; outside option.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-IND-2013-04-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2013-04-20 (Microeconomics)
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