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Public implementation of Blockchain Technology

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This paper discusses the avenues through which a public implementation of blockchain could deliver efficiency gains in the running of a government. We discuss some of the current inefficiencies in recordkeeping and the efficiency improvements that could come about if recordkeeping, including keeping track of tax liability, would be “put on the blockchain”. We discuss some of the current issues with transaction costs and property rights that governments face and how these could be addressed with blockchain. We also discuss issues with asymmetric information in general and moral hazard in particular that are ripe in the delivery of public services and how blockchain could be used to reduce them to achieve efficiency gains and better outcomes for public policy.

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  • Dean Franklet & Laura Meriluoto & George Ross & Cameron Scott & Patrick Williams, 2018. "Public implementation of Blockchain Technology," Working Papers in Economics 18/23, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbt:econwp:18/23
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    File URL: https://repec.canterbury.ac.nz/cbt/econwp/1823.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Blockchain; government; recordkeeping; transaction costs; asymmetric information; principle-agent problem; moral hazard;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies

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