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Multi-Office Incumbency Advantage: Political Careers in Brazil

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  • Leandro De Magalhães
  • Salomo Hirvonen

Abstract

Incumbency may have effects on a political career that go beyond increasing the probability of reelection. In particular, incumbency may affect the probability of winning different political offices. So far, the literature has not looked at these multi-office incumbency effects. In contexts where politicians move frequently to other offices, ignoring multi-office advantages may generate biased estimates of the true effect of holding a political office on the success of one's career. We define Multi-Office Incumbency Advantage and study it using a novel data set that tracks all Brazilian politicians, from local councillor to federal legislator, from 1994 to 2010. Furthermore, we use our results to evaluate two standing hypothesis regarding Brazilian politics. The first is that there is an incumbency disadvantage in Brazil. The second is the hypothesis that holding a federal legislative office is a spring board to becoming a Mayor. We find no support for either.

Suggested Citation

  • Leandro De Magalhães & Salomo Hirvonen, 2015. "Multi-Office Incumbency Advantage: Political Careers in Brazil," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 15/662, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    • Handle: RePEc:bri:uobdis:15/662
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    File URL: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/efm/media/workingpapers/working_papers/pdffiles/dp15662.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leandro de Magalhaes & Salomo Hirvonen, 2019. "The Incumbent-Challenger Advantage and the Winner-Runner-up Advantage," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 19/710, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incumbency Advantage; Political Careers; Regression Discontinuity Design; Brazil.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General

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