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Competition Law in Telecommunications and its Implications for Common Carriage of Water

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  • Paul A Grout

Abstract

As with most water companies in the world UK water companies face very little competition for the delivery of water within their area. However, recently both the government and the regulator, Ofwat, have indicated that they wish to see a major change in the industry through a significant growth of competition. The pricing of common carriage of water will be central to whether this objective can be achieved. The aim of this paper is assess UK and European competition policy in telecommunications and the lessons that can be learnt from this for the regulation of common carriage in the water industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul A Grout, 2002. "Competition Law in Telecommunications and its Implications for Common Carriage of Water," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/056, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    • Handle: RePEc:bri:cmpowp:02/056
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    File URL: http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/workingpapers/wp56.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cave, Martin, 1997. "The evolution of telecommunications regulation in the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 691-699, April.
    2. Valletti, Tommaso M., 1999. "The practice of access pricing: telecommunications in the United Kingdom," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 83-98, June.
    3. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-564, May.
    4. Baumol, W. J., 2001. "Economically defensible access pricing, competition and preservation of socially desirable cross subsidy," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 151-159.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-256, November.
    6. Grout, Paul A, 1984. "Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargining Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 449-460, March.
    7. Hern, R., 2001. "Competition and access pricing in the UK water industry," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 117-127.
    8. Aitman, D., 2001. "Competition law constraints on access charges in the England and Wales water industry," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 129-136.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reto Foellmi & Urs Meister, 2012. "Enhancing the Efficiency of Water Supply—Product Market Competition Versus Trade," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 299-324, September.
    2. Marks, Phillipa & Williamson, Brian, 2004. "Profitability tests in competition law and ex ante regulation," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 71-75, June.
    3. Reto Foellmi & Urs Meister, 2005. "Product-Market Competition in the Water Industry: Voluntary Non-discriminatory Pricing," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 115-135, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    anti-trust; competition policy; regulation; utilities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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