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Free and Open-Source Software: Coordination and Competition

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  • Robin Ng

Abstract

Free and Open-Source Software (FOSS) are developed by a community of developers led by a coordinator. Coordinators balance the following trade-off: (i) more developers improve FOSS quality—a positive vertical differentiation effect; (ii) more developers lead to more diverse views, driving FOSS characteristics away from the preferences of existing developers—a negative horizontal differentiation effect. FOSS are able to attract more developers when coordinators improve their level of coordination, increasing the marginal vertical network effect, or by having a more permissive Open-Source license, increasing the marginal horizontal network effect. More permissive Open-Source licenses can intensify competition between FOSS and proprietary software, resulting in lower prices. However permissive licenses may reduce the incentives to coordinate FOSS, leading to lower quality FOSS that only serve niche markets. I explore coordinators who may have different motivations—self-interested Founders, volunteering Altruists, and profit-driven Managers—discussing when and how they choose to coordinate FOSS.

Suggested Citation

  • Robin Ng, 2024. "Free and Open-Source Software: Coordination and Competition," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_585, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_585
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp585
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Open-Source Software; Network effects; Software Licensing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D26 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Crowd-Based Firms
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets

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