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Smart Banks

Author

Listed:
  • Alkis Georgiadis-Harris
  • Maxi Guennewig
  • Yuliyan Mitkov

Abstract

Since Diamond and Dybvig (1983), banks have been viewed as inherently fragile. We challenge this view in a general mechanism design framework, where we allow for ŕexibility in the design of banking mechanisms while maintaining limited commitment of the intermediary to future mechanisms. We őnd that the unique equilibrium outcome is efficient. Consequently, runs cannot occur in equilibrium. Our analysis points to the ultimate source of fragility: banks are fragile if they cannot collect and optimally respond to useful information during a run and not because they engage in maturity transformation. We link our banking mechanisms to recent technological advances surrounding ‘smart contracts,’ which enrich the practical possibilities for banking arrangements.

Suggested Citation

  • Alkis Georgiadis-Harris & Maxi Guennewig & Yuliyan Mitkov, 2024. "Smart Banks," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_540, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_540
    as

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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp540
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yannis Bakos & Hanna Halaburda, 2020. "Platform Competition with Multihoming on Both Sides: Subsidize or Not?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5599-5607, December.
    2. Holden,Richard & Malani,Anup, 2021. "Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781009001397, January.
    3. Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1998. "Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 27-38, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank runs; őnancial fragility; mechanism design; limited commitment; smart contracts.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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