Smart Banks
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Yannis Bakos & Hanna Halaburda, 2020.
"Platform Competition with Multihoming on Both Sides: Subsidize or Not?,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5599-5607, December.
- Yannis Bakos & Hanna Halaburda, 2019. "Platform Competition with Multihoming on Both Sides: Subsidize or Not?," Working Papers 19-12, NET Institute.
- Yannis Bakos & Hanna Halaburda, 2020. "Platform Competition with Multi-Homing on Both Sides: Subsidize or Not?," CESifo Working Paper Series 8126, CESifo.
- Holden,Richard & Malani,Anup, 2021.
"Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9781009001397, January.
- Richard T. Holden & Anup Malani, 2019. "Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?," NBER Working Papers 25833, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1998. "Bank runs: Liquidity costs and investment distortions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 27-38, February.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Günnewig, Maximilian & Georgiadis-Harris, Alkis & Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2024. "Smart Banks," VfS Annual Conference 2024 (Berlin): Upcoming Labor Market Challenges 302331, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Benito Arruñada, 2020.
"Prospects of Blockchain in Contract and Property,"
Springer Books, in: Amnon Lehavi & Ronit Levine-Schnur (ed.), Disruptive Technology, Legal Innovation, and the Future of Real Estate, edition 1, pages 35-55,
Springer.
- Benito Arruñada, 2020. "Prospects of blockchain in contract and property," Economics Working Papers 1696, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Benito Arruñada, 2020. "Prospects of Blockchain in Contract and Property," Working Papers 1155, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Huberto Ennis & Todd Keister, 2016.
"Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 61(2), pages 335-363, February.
- Todd Keister & Huberto Ennis, 2012. "Optimal banking contracts and financial fragility," 2012 Meeting Papers 179, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2015. "Optimal Banking Contracts and Financial Fragility," Working Paper 15-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Makoto (M.) Watanabe & Tarishi Matsuoka, 2019.
"Banking Panics and the Lender of Last Resort in a Monetary Economy,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
19-002/V, Tinbergen Institute.
- Tarishi Matsuoka & Makoto Watanabe, 2019. "Banking Panics and the Lender of Last Resort in a Monetary Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 7451, CESifo.
- Kirti, Divya, 2024.
"When gambling for resurrection is too risky,"
Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
- Mr. Divya Kirti, 2017. "When Gambling for Resurrection is Too Risky," IMF Working Papers 2017/180, International Monetary Fund.
- Kirti, Divya, 2018. "When gambling for resurrection is too risky," ESRB Working Paper Series 69, European Systemic Risk Board.
- Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2003.
"Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 220-245, April.
- Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2003. "Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs," Working Paper 03-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Mark Egan & Ali Hortaçsu & Gregor Matvos, 2017.
"Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(1), pages 169-216, January.
- Gregor Matvos & Ali Hortacsu & Mark Egan, 2015. "Deposit Competition and Financial Fragility: Evidence from the US Banking Sector," 2015 Meeting Papers 1363, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Todd Keister, 2016.
"Bailouts and Financial Fragility,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 704-736.
- Todd Keister, 2010. "Bailouts and financial fragility," Staff Reports 473, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Todd Keister, 2014. "Bailouts and Financial Fragility," Departmental Working Papers 201401, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2012.
"Bagehot for beginners: the making of lender‐of‐last‐resort operations in the mid‐nineteenth century,"
Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 65(2), pages 580-608, May.
- Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2009. "Bagehot for beginners: The making of lending of last resort operations in the mid-19th century," Working Paper 2009/22, Norges Bank.
- Vincent Bignon & Marc Flandreau & Stefano Ugolini, 2012. "Bagehot for Beginners : The Making of Lender of Last Resort Operations in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," Post-Print halshs-00844045, HAL.
- Rojas, Luis E. & Thaler, Dominik, 2024.
"The bright side of the doom loop: Banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).
- Rojas, Luis E. & Thaler, Dominik, 2023. "The bright side of the doom loop: banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives," Working Paper Series 2869, European Central Bank.
- Luis E. Rojas & Dominik Thaler, 2024. "The bright side of the doom loop: banks’ sovereign exposure and default incentives," Working Papers 2409, Banco de España.
- Paula Lourdes Hernández Verme & Mónica Karina Rosales Pérez, 2016. "Applications of sudden stops of international capital to the Mexican economy," Working Papers 74, Peruvian Economic Association.
- Marie-Hélène Felt & Angelika Welte & Katrina Talavera, 2024. "Untapped Potential: Mobile Device Ownership and Mobile Payments in Canada," Staff Working Papers 24-25, Bank of Canada.
- Antoine Martin, 2005. "Reconciling Bagehot with the Fed's response to September 11," Staff Reports 217, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Fecht, Falko & Eder, Armin & Pausch, Thilo, 2013.
"Banks, Markets, and Financial Stability,"
VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order
79712, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Eder, Armin & Fecht, Falko & Pausch, Thilo, 2014. "Banks, markets, and financial stability," Discussion Papers 31/2014, Deutsche Bundesbank.
- Olivier Meier & Aurélie Sannajust, 0. "The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
- Gu, Chao & Monnet, Cyril & Nosal, Ed & Wright, Randall, 2023.
"Diamond–Dybvig and beyond: On the instability of banking,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
- Chao Gu & Cyril Monnet & Ed Nosal & Randall Wright, 2023. "Diamond-Dybvig and Beyond: On the Instability of Banking," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2023-02, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal, 2018.
"Bank Runs without Sequential Service,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2018-6, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- David Andolfatto & Ed Nosal, 2018. "Bank runs without sequential service," Working Papers 2018-16, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Spiegel, Mark M., 2005.
"Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts,"
Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 203-219, January.
- Mark M. Spiegel, 2000. "Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts," Working Paper Series 2001-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
- repec:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_428v2 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alejandro Gaytan & Romain Ranciere, 2004.
"Wealth, Financial Intermediation and Growth,"
Working Papers
191, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Ranciere Romain & Gaytán González Alejandro, 2005. "Wealth Financial Intermediation and Growth," Working Papers 2005-02, Banco de México.
- Alejandro Gaytan & Romain Rancière, 2004. "Wealth, financial intermediation and growth," Economics Working Papers 851, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2004.
- Liu, Xia & Megginson, William & Tran, Nhu & Wei, Siqi, 2024. "Who Loses Most When Big Banks Suddenly Fail? Evidence from Silicon Valley Bank Collapse," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
More about this item
Keywords
Bank runs; őnancial fragility; mechanism design; limited commitment; smart contracts.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BAN-2024-05-27 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2024-05-27 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-FDG-2024-05-27 (Financial Development and Growth)
- NEP-MIC-2024-05-27 (Microeconomics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_540. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CRC Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.crctr224.de .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.