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Can Media Pluralism Be Harmful to News Quality?

Author

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  • Federico Innocenti

Abstract

I study the effect of polarization and competition on information provision. With a single expert who faces decision-makers with het- erogeneous priors, the expert solves a trade-off between persuading sceptics and retaining believers. With high polarization, an expert has incentives to supply low-quality information to leverage believers' credulity. With multiple experts with opposite biases, competition is harmful if attention is limited. Unbiased and Bayesian decision-makers rationally devote attention to like-minded experts. Echo chambers arise endogenously, whereas decision-makers would be better informed in monopoly. My model can rationalize the spread and persistence of conspiracy theories and fake news.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Innocenti, 2021. "Can Media Pluralism Be Harmful to News Quality?," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_298v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_298v2
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp298
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    Cited by:

    1. Pallavi Dogra & Arun Kaushal & Prateek Kalia, 2024. "What drives the investment intentions of emerging economy millennials? Examining the effect of financial advertisement with the PLS-SEM," Journal of Financial Services Marketing, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 29(2), pages 276-291, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian Persuasion; Competition; Echo Chambers; Heterogeneous Priors; Limited Attention; Media Pluralism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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