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Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach

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  • L. Lambertini
  • A. Mantovani
  • E. Scorcu

Abstract

We investigate the bearings product market collusion on the abatement of polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate the feedback solution of two alternative settings: a fully noncooperative oligopoly and a cartel maximising the discounted profits of all firms in the industry. Our analysis proves that the output reduction entailed by collusive behaviour may have a benefiacial effect on steady state welfare, as a result of the balance between a higher market price and a lower amount of polluting emissions. This result opens a new prespective on the debate about the management of environmental externalities, which so far has mainly focussed on the design of Pigouvian taxation schemes.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Lambertini & A. Mantovani & E. Scorcu, 2007. "Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach," Working Papers 615, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    • Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:615
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Karp, Larry & Livernois, John, 1992. "On efficiency-inducing taxation for a non-renewable resource monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 219-239, November.
    2. Karp Larry & Livernois John, 1994. "Using Automatic Tax Changes to Control Pollution Emissions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 38-48, July.
    3. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
    4. Benchekroun, Hassan & Van Long, Ngo, 2002. "On the multiplicity of efficiency-inducing tax rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 331-336, August.
    5. Bergstrom, Theodore C. & Cross, John G. & Porter, Richard C., 1981. "Efficiency-inducing taxation for a monopolistically supplied depletable resource," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 23-32, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. M. Fadaee, 2011. "A Dynamic Approach to the Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalization," Working Papers wp746, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    2. Dragone, Davide & Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2014. "Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 4(1), pages 15-40, April.

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