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Las reglas de responsabilidad fiscal en el Uruguay

Author

Listed:
  • Gerardo Licandro

    (Banco Central del Uruguay)

Abstract

En el año 2000, como tantas veces en los últimos 5 años, se volverá a plantear la necesidad de modificar la legislación de topes de deuda, la cual ha demostrado con su obsolescencia su falta de adecuación a las necesidades del país. Este trabajo intenta aportar elementos en la discusión acerca de cuales serían las reglas fiscales más apropiadas para el caso uruguayo. De la comparación de cuatro reglas fiscales (tope sobre deuda con ajuste en base a producto potencial, tope de deuda con ajuste en base al crecimiento promedio del producto en el último ciclo económico, tope de déficit, y tope sobre el gasto) surge que un tope sobre el déficit ajustado por el ciclo, al tiempo que garantiza la estabilidad global de la ecuación presupuestal uruguaya, provee herramientas para atemperar el ciclo económico, lo que lo convierte en el más adecuado a la realidad nacional de las reglas consideradas.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerardo Licandro, 2000. "Las reglas de responsabilidad fiscal en el Uruguay," Documentos de trabajo 2000006, Banco Central del Uruguay.
    • Handle: RePEc:bku:doctra:2000006
    as

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    File URL: https://www.bcu.gub.uy/Estadisticas-e-Indicadores/Documentos%20de%20Trabajo/6.2000.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2000
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Enrique Alberola & Luis Molina, 2003. "What Does Really Discipline Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets?: the Role and Dynamics of Exchange Rate Regimes," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 165-192, July-Dece.
    2. Gerardo Licandro & José Antonio Licandro, 2001. "Anatomía y patología de la dolarización," Documentos de trabajo 2001003, Banco Central del Uruguay, revised Dec 2001.
    3. Elizabeth Bucacos, 2022. "The interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in an Emerging economy: The case of Uruguay," International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 11(1), pages 19-33, January.
    4. Álvaro Rojas O. & Felipe Jaque S., 2003. "Determinants of the Chilean Sovereign Spread: is it Purely Fundamentals?," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 137-163, July-Dece.
    5. Tamara Burdisso & Verónica Cohen Sabban & Laura D'Amato, 2003. "The Argentine Banking and Exchange Crisis of 2001: Can we Learn Something New About Financial Crisis?," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 89-136, July-Dece.
    6. Gerardo Licandro & José Antonio Licandro, 2003. "Building the Dedollarization Agenda: Lessons from the Uruguayan Case," Money Affairs, CEMLA, vol. 0(2), pages 193-218, July-Dece.

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