IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bge/wpaper/248.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Author

Listed:
  • Salvador Barberà
  • Anke Gerber

Abstract

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Anke Gerber, 2005. "A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games," Working Papers 248, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:248
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.barcelonagse.eu/sites/default/files/working_paper_pdfs/248.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, August.
    2. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
    3. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
    4. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203]," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 355-356, December.
    5. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    2. Tania Singer & Ernst Fehr, 2005. "The Neuroeconomics of Mind Reading and Empathy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 340-345, May.
    3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "Dynamic stable set," Discussion Papers 33, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    5. Eric Weese, 2015. "Political mergers as coalition formation: An analysis of the Heisei municipal amalgamations," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), pages 257-307, July.
    6. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Seçkin Özbilen, 2023. "Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences," Working Papers 1399, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Hannu Vartiainen, 2008. "One-deviation principle in coalition formation," Discussion Papers 35, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    8. Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, "undated". "The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wages," IEW - Working Papers 247, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    9. Fehr, Ernst & Fischbacher, Urs & Kosfeld, Michael, 2005. "Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 1641, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Casajus, André, 2008. "On the stability of coalition structures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 271-274, August.
    11. Weese, Eric, 2008. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation : Evidence from Japanese Municipal Amalgamations," CCES Discussion Paper Series 5, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    12. Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez, 2009. "Strategy-proof coalition formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 431-452, November.
    13. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    14. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    15. Eric Weese, 2011. "Political Mergers as Coalition Formation," Working Papers 997, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    2. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2007. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 105-125, September.
    3. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    5. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203]," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 355-356, December.
    6. Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "The core-partition of a hedonic game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 176-185, September.
    7. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2010. "Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(3), pages 1-13, September.
    8. Han, Lining & Juarez, Ruben & Vargas, Miguel, 2023. "Robust equilibria in tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 423-439.
    9. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo.
    10. Ana Mauleon & Elena Molis & Vincent Vannetelbosch & Wouter Vergote, 2014. "Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(4), pages 925-943, November.
    11. Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2020. "Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 32-54.
    12. Mauleon, Ana & Roehl, Nils & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2019. "Paths to stability for overlapping group structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 19-24.
    13. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    14. Shao Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2007. "On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 31-45, February.
    15. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2006. "A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    16. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April.
    17. Kimya, Mert, 2020. "Farsighted Objections and Maximality in One-to-one Matching Problems," Working Papers 202014, University of Sydney, School of Economics, revised Jul 2021.
    18. Kenzo Imamura & Hideo Konishi, 2023. "Assortative Matching with Externalities and Farsighted Agents," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 497-509, June.
    19. Papai, Szilvia, 2004. "Unique stability in simple coalition formation games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 337-354, August.
    20. Kimya, Mert, 2020. "Farsighted Objections and Maximality in One-to-one Matching Problems," Working Papers 2020-14, University of Sydney, School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hedonic Game; Coalition formation; stability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:248. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bruno Guallar (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/bargses.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.