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The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis

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  • Benito Arruñada

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the main tradeoffs in the organization of public registries, comparing five forms of organization: (1) the bureaucracies or "discretionary expense centers" used to provide privately valuable services in the welfare state; (2) the internal markets introduced to reform them, and the hybrid solutions that have been used by the liberal state since the 19th century to provide such privately valuable services, including (3) revenue centers based on user fees; (4) franchised systems in which professional civil servants are paid from the profit of an office; and (5) the contemporary variant in which the Government contracts out the provision of the whole service to a private firm. This comparison suggests that market forces may play a better role in organizing public registries when they are limited to a few variables, which makes stronger incentives possible while, at the same time, reducing the need for extensive planning and supervisory staff.

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  • Benito Arruñada, 2020. "The Organization of Public Registries: A Comparative Analysis," Working Papers 1154, Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1154
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benito ArruÒada, 2003. "Property Enforcement as Organized Consent," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(2), pages 401-444, October.
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    3. Arruñada, Benito & Hansen, Stephen, 2015. "Organizing public good provision: Lessons from Managerial Accounting," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 185-191.
    4. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1964. "Control in Large Organizations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 397-408, April.
    5. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-233, April.
    6. Blair,Roger D. & Lafontaine,Francine, 2011. "The Economics of Franchising," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521775892, September.
    7. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Heckling, 1995. "Specific And General Knowledge, And Organizational Structure," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 8(2), pages 4-18, June.
    8. Dunleavy, Patrick, 1985. "Bureaucrats, Budgets and the Growth of the State: Reconstructing an Instrumental Model," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 299-328, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    internal markets; competition; Bureaucracy; registries; welfare; Incentives; user fees; user choice; privatization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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