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Output-oriented regulation - an overview

Author

Listed:
  • Gert Brunekreeft
  • Julia Kusznir
  • Roland Meyer

Abstract

With output-oriented regulation (OOR), this report addresses a current development in regulatory practice that is becoming increasingly relevant, particularly as a result of the energy transition. The aim of OOR is the targeted incentivisation of predefined performance targets (outputs) that are not promoted to the extent desired by society within the framework of incentive regulation, which is otherwise primarily geared towards cost efficiency. OOR does not replace the existing revenue cap of incentive regulation, but supplements it with revenue elements (such as bonus/penalty payments) that are linked to the achievement of regulatory output targets. In the underlying study, the central economic reasons for the use of output-orientated regulatory instruments were discussed and specific areas of application for the regulation of electricity grid operators were identified and discussed. Three justifications for OOR take centre stage: 1. value creation, 2. whole system approach, and 3. cost-side distortion and risk. The justifications can often be traced back to external effects that can be internalised by means of OOR. However, depending on the area of application, the actual implementation is associated with challenges that could only be hinted at in this study and require more in-depth analysis.

Suggested Citation

  • Gert Brunekreeft & Julia Kusznir & Roland Meyer, 2020. "Output-oriented regulation - an overview," Bremen Energy Working Papers 0035, Bremen Energy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:bei:00bewp:0035en
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Capex-bias; risk; electric utilities; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation

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