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Crowdfunding and Risk

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  • David Cimon

Abstract

This paper examines the role of rewards-based and equity-based crowdfunding in funding new businesses. In this model, crowdfunding is a unique technology that serves as a real option for production and eliminates downside risk. It affords entrepreneurs who face uncertain consumer demand a viable means of funding new projects. Crowdfunding performs well for projects with a high variability in demand and a low probability of success. Conversely, crowdfunding does not perform well for large projects with little variability in demand or for projects where the production side is uncertain.

Suggested Citation

  • David Cimon, 2023. "Crowdfunding and Risk," Staff Working Papers 23-28, Bank of Canada.
    • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:23-28
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Digital currencies and fintech; Financial markets; Financial services;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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