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E-Money: Efficiency, Stability and Optimal Policy

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  • Jonathan Chiu
  • Tsz-Nga Wong

Abstract

What makes e-money more special than cash? Is the introduction of e-money necessarily welfare enhancing? Is an e-money system necessarily stable? What is the optimal way to design an efficient and stable e-money scheme? This paper provides a first attempt to develop a micro-founded, dynamic, general-equilibrium model of e-money for investigating these policy issues. We first identify some superior features of e-money which help mitigate informational frictions and enhance social welfare in a cash economy. A model that features both trading frictions and two-sided platforms is then built and used to compare two potential e-money schemes: (i) public provision of e-money with decentralized adoption, and (ii) private monopolistic provision of e-money. We show that, in general, both public and private provision of e-money are inefficient, and we characterize the optimal incentive scheme by addressing four potential sources of inefficiency – market powers in goods trading, network externality, liquidity constraint and monopoly distortion in e-money issuance. We show that the welfare impact of e-money depends critically on whether cash is a viable alternative to e-money as a means of payment. When it is not (e.g., for online payments where usage of money is prohibitively costly), the adoption of e-money is always welfare enhancing, albeit not welfare maximizing. However, when cash is a viable alternative (e.g., in a coffee shop), introducing e-money can sometimes reduce social welfare. Moreover, a system with public provision and decentralized adoption is inherently unstable, while a planner or a private issuer can design a pricing scheme to restore stability. Lastly, we examine an alternative e-money scheme – a hypothetical set-up with public provision through a private platform. We also compare the impact of various provision schemes on central bank seigniorage income. While this scheme may or may not improve efficiency, it can always increase seigniorage income, even though there may exist better policy options such as imposing a cash reserve requirement or collecting a charter fee.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Chiu & Tsz-Nga Wong, 2014. "E-Money: Efficiency, Stability and Optimal Policy," Staff Working Papers 14-16, Bank of Canada.
    • Handle: RePEc:bca:bocawp:14-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ben Fung & Miguel Molico & Gerald Stuber, 2014. "Electronic Money and Payments: Recent Developments and Issues," Discussion Papers 14-2, Bank of Canada.
    2. Gautam Gowrisankaran & Joanna Stavins, 2004. "Network Externalities and Technology Adoption: Lessons from Electronic Payments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 260-276, Summer.
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    4. Gans Joshua S & King Stephen P, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
    5. E. Glen Weyl, 2010. "A Price Theory of Multi-sided Platforms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1642-1672, September.
    6. Antoine Martin & Michael Orlando & David Skeie, 2008. "Payment networks in a search model of money," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 104-132, January.
    7. Jonathan Chiu & Tsz-Nga Wong, 2015. "On the Essentiality of E-Money," Staff Working Papers 15-43, Bank of Canada.
    8. Monnet, Cyril & Roberds, William, 2008. "Optimal pricing of payment services," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(8), pages 1428-1440, November.
    9. Kocherlakota, Narayana R., 1998. "Money Is Memory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 232-251, August.
    10. Arango, Carlos & Huynh, Kim P. & Sabetti, Leonard, 2011. "How do you pay? The role of incentives at the point-of-sale," Working Paper Series 1386, European Central Bank.
    11. Wright, Julian, 2003. "Optimal card payment systems," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 587-612, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Raphael Auer & Giulio Cornelli & Jon Frost, 2020. "Rise of the central bank digital currencies: drivers, approaches and technologies," BIS Working Papers 880, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Jonathan Chiu & Tsz-Nga Wong, 2015. "On the Essentiality of E-Money," Staff Working Papers 15-43, Bank of Canada.
    3. Charles M. Kahn & Francisco Rivadeneyra & Tsz-Nga Wong, 2018. "Should the Central Bank Issue E-money?," Staff Working Papers 18-58, Bank of Canada.
    4. James Chapman & Carolyn A. Wilkins, 2019. "Crypto ‘Money’: Perspective of a Couple of Canadian Central Bankers," Discussion Papers 2019-1, Bank of Canada.
    5. Fernández-Villaverde, Jesús & Sanches, Daniel, 2019. "Can currency competition work?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 1-15.
    6. Chiu, Jonathan & Wong, Tsz-Nga, 2022. "Payments on digital platforms: Resiliency, interoperability and welfare," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    7. Jasmina Arifovic & John Duffy & Janet Hua Jiang, 2017. "Adoption of a New Payment Method: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Staff Working Papers 17-28, Bank of Canada.
    8. Jasmina Arifovic & John Duffy & Janet Jiang, 2017. "Adoption of a New Payment System: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 171801, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    9. Élise Alfieri & Yann Ferrat, 2022. "The larger compensation for miners, the higher positive effect on the financial performance of cryptocurrencies [Une meilleure rémunération des mineurs : un effet positif sur la performance financi," Post-Print hal-03670074, HAL.
    10. Jonathan Chiu & Tsz-Nga Wong, 2015. "On the Essentiality of E-Money," Staff Working Papers 15-43, Bank of Canada.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank notes; E-money; Payment clearing and settlement systems;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • L - Industrial Organization
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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