IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ays/ispwps/paper1714.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Provision of Local Public Goods in Proportional Representation Electoral Systems with Closed and Open Party Lists

Author

Abstract

In this paper we find that the institutional set up of proportional representation systems matters for the welfare properties related with the ideal structure of government providing local public goods. In particular, we study the role of party centralization vs party decentralization in the provision of local public goods. In this paper, we show that the provision of local public goods with inter-regional spillovers by a system of local governments (welfare) dominates the fiscally centralized provision in economies with a proportional representation electoral system and closed party lists. We call this outcome the strong decentralization theorem. For this type of economies, the conventional decentralization theorem (originally identified by Oates 1972) is also satisfied. For economies with a proportional representation and open party lists systems the strong decentralization theorem is satisfied only when party centralization (i.e., the ability of party leaders to nominate candidates in the party’s lists) plays a dominant role in determining the policy platforms of candidates. However, if there is party decentralization (parties lack the ability to influence policy through the nomination process in the party’s list) the strong decentralization theorem is not satisfied. Lastly, the conventional decentralization theorem is satisfied in economies with proportional representation electoral systems and open party lists in both type of party systems: centralized and decentralized.

Suggested Citation

  • Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2017. "The Provision of Local Public Goods in Proportional Representation Electoral Systems with Closed and Open Party Lists," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1714, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1714
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2021/07/paper1714.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Raúl A Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2018. "Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization: How Elections and Parties Shape the Provision of Local Public Goods," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 48(4), pages 523-558.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raúl A Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2018. "Rethinking the Political Economy of Decentralization: How Elections and Parties Shape the Provision of Local Public Goods," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 48(4), pages 523-558.
    2. Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2016. "Political Institutions and Federalism: A "Strong" Decentralization Theorem," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1603, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    3. Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2016. "Political institutions and federalism: a “strong” decentralization theorem," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1604, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kumba Digdowiseiso, 2022. "Is Fiscal Decentralization Growth Enhancing? A Cross-Country Study in Developing Countries over the Period 1990–2014," Economies, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-17, March.
    2. Kshitiz Shrestha & Jorge Martinez‐Vazquez & Charles Hankla, 2023. "Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 411-439, March.
    3. Terrence Iverson & Edward Barbier, 2021. "National and Sub-National Social Distancing Responses to COVID-19," Economies, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-15, May.
    4. Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2016. "Political institutions and federalism: a “strong” decentralization theorem," Working Papers. Collection A: Public economics, governance and decentralization 1604, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.
    5. Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2016. "Political Institutions and Federalism: A "Strong" Decentralization Theorem," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1603, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    6. Mengxue Ji & Zhenming Wu & Dandan Zhu, 2023. "Environmental Vertical Management and Enterprises’ Performance: Evidence from Water Pollution Reduction in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(19), pages 1-17, September.
    7. Raúl A. Ponce-Rodríguez & Charles R. Hankla & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Eunice Heredia-Ortiz, 2020. "The politics of fiscal federalism: Building a stronger decentralization theorem," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 32(4), pages 605-639, October.
    8. Vlad Tarko, 2021. "Local Accountability and National Coordination in Fiscal Federalism, by Charles Hankla, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 51(2), pages 16-16.
    9. Gamalerio, Matteo, 2020. "Do national political parties matter? Evidence from Italian municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    10. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Agnese Sacchi, 2017. "The Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1095-1129, September.
    11. Myerson, Roger B., 2014. "Local foundations for better governance : A Review of Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao's Localizing Development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7131, The World Bank.
    12. Estache, Antonio & Garsous, Grégoire & Seroa da Motta, Ronaldo, 2016. "Shared Mandates, Moral Hazard, and Political (Mis)alignment in a Decentralized Economy," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 98-110.
    13. Estache, Antonio & Garsous, Grégoire & Seroa da Motta, Ronaldo, 2016. "Shared Mandates, Moral Hazard, and Political (Mis)alignment in a Decentralized Economy," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 98-110.
    14. Gabriel Natividad, 2022. "Decentralizing investment: Evidence from municipal organization after close elections," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 734-761, August.
    15. Meinzen-Dick, Laura, 2020. "Decentralization and Elections in Burkina Faso," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304447, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    16. Geiguen Shin & Byong‐Kuen Jhee, 2021. "Better service delivery, more satisfied citizens? The mediating effects of local government management capacity in South Korea," Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 42-67, January.
    17. Daniel Gama e Colombo & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 2018. "Fiscal Decentralization and Public R&D Policy: A Country Panel Analysis," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1820, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1714. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Paul Benson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ispgsus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.