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Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control

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  • Balietti, Anca
  • Budjan, Angelika
  • Eymess, Tillmann
  • Soldà, Alice

Abstract

Information can trigger unpleasant emotions. As a result, individuals might be tempted to strategically ignore it. We experimentally investigate whether increasing perceived control can mitigate strategic ignorance. Participants from India were presented with a choice to receive information about the health risk associated with air pollution and were later asked to recall it. Perceived control leads to a substantial improvement in information recall. We find that optimists react most to perceived control, both with a reduction in information avoidance and an increase in information recall. This latter result is supported by a US sample. A theoretical framework rationalizes our findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Balietti, Anca & Budjan, Angelika & Eymess, Tillmann & Soldà, Alice, 2023. "Strategic Ignorance and Perceived Control," Working Papers 0735, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:awi:wpaper:0735
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    Keywords

    information avoidance; information recall; perceived control; motivated cognition; air pollution; Luftverschmutzung;
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