IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/aue/wpaper/1519.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Environmental Policy: The Coevolution of Pollution and Compliance

Author

Listed:
  • Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos
  • Anastasios Xepapadeas

Abstract

We study the evolution of compliance of firms in a setup of taxable emissions. Firms can either choose to comply with the emissions rule or violate it. Violation is considered either as a single option or is let to vary between low and high emissions, inducing a different level of fine if the firm gets caught. The firms can switch between strategies according to an evolutionary proportional rule and the conditions for stability are investigated accounting for two distinct types of probability of inspection.

Suggested Citation

  • Yannis Petrohilos-Andrianos & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2015. "Environmental Policy: The Coevolution of Pollution and Compliance," DEOS Working Papers 1519, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    • Handle: RePEc:aue:wpaper:1519
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://wpa.deos.aueb.gr/docs/The.Coevolution.of.Pollution.and.Compliance.pdf
    File Function: First version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fullerton, Don & West, Sarah E., 2002. "Can Taxes on Cars and on Gasoline Mimic an Unavailable Tax on Emissions?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 135-157, January.
    2. Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, 2011. "The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical Evidence," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 5(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    3. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    4. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jonas Hedlund & Carlos Oyarzun, 2018. "Imitation in heterogeneous populations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(4), pages 937-973, June.
    2. Dehai Liu & Hongyi Li & Weiguo Wang & Chuang Zhou, 2015. "Scenario forecast model of long term trends in rural labor transfer based on evolutionary games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 649-670, July.
    3. Michael Kosfeld, 2002. "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 321-339.
    4. Noemi Schmitt & Jan Tuinstra & Frank Westerhoff, 2018. "Stability and welfare effects of profit taxes within an evolutionary market interaction model," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(3), pages 691-708, August.
    5. Petrohilos-Andrianos, Yannis & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 2017. "Resource harvesting regulation and enforcement: An evolutionary approach," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 236-253.
    6. Karl H. Schlag, 2007. "Distribution-Free Learning," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/01, European University Institute.
    7. Waters, George A., 2009. "Chaos in the cobweb model with a new learning dynamic," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1201-1216, June.
    8. Baldini, Ryan, 2012. "Success-biased social learning: Cultural and evolutionary dynamics," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 222-228.
    9. Schumacher, Heiner, 2013. "Imitating cooperation and the formation of long-term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 409-417.
    10. David Hirshleifer & Joshua B. Plotkin, 2021. "Moonshots, investment booms, and selection bias in the transmission of cultural traits," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 118(26), pages 2015571118-, June.
    11. Mengel, Friederike, 2008. "Matching structure and the cultural transmission of social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 608-623, September.
    12. Basov, S., 2001. "An Evolutionary Model of Reciprocity," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 812, The University of Melbourne.
    13. Floriana Gargiulo & José J Ramasco, 2012. "Influence of Opinion Dynamics on the Evolution of Games," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 7(11), pages 1-7, November.
    14. Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    15. Antonio Morales, 2005. "On the Role of the Group Composition for Achieving Optimality," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 387-397, July.
    16. Lenzo, Justin & Sarver, Todd, 2006. "Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 271-284, August.
    17. Alessandro Lizzeri & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2008. "Parental Guidance and Supervised Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(3), pages 1161-1195.
    18. Boncinelli Leonardo, 2008. "Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, June.
    19. Klaus Abbink & Ronald Bosman & Ronald Heijmans & Frans van Winden, 2017. "Disruptions in Large-Value Payment Systems: An Experimental Approach," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(4), pages 63-95, December.
    20. Fosco, Constanza & Mengel, Friederike, 2011. "Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 641-658, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Emission taxes; compliance; replicator dynamics.;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aue:wpaper:1519. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ekaterini Glynou (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/diauegr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.