Pressure Groups and Experts in Environmental Regulation
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- Porteiro, Nicolas, 2008. "Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 156-175, January.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Tapas Kundu & Tore Nilssen, 2022. "Delegating pollution permits," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(2), pages 457-487, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
environmental regulation; ignorance; environmentalists; experts.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENE-2001-11-27 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENT-2001-11-27 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-NET-2001-11-27 (Network Economics)
- NEP-RES-2001-11-05 (Resource Economics)
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