Continuous Reaction Functions In Duopolies
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- Friedman James W. & Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Continuous Reaction Functions in Duopolies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 55-82, January.
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Cited by:
- Meyer, Margaret & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Nafziger, Julia, 2019.
"Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
- Meyer, Margaret & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Nafziger, Julia, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 11224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Papers 2016-W02, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2019. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Series Working Papers 789, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2006. "Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 199, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
- Shaffer, Sherrill & Shogren, Jason F., 2009.
"Repeated contests: A general parameterization,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 159-161, November.
- Sherrill Shaffer & Jason F. Shogren, 2008. "Related Contests: A General Parameterization," CAMA Working Papers 2008-27, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Shaffer, Sherrill, 2004. "Patterns of competition in banking," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 287-313.
- Artem Baklanov, 2021. "Reactive Strategies: An Inch of Memory, a Mile of Equilibria," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-28, May.
- Sherrill Shaffer, 2000. "Correlation Tests for Competitive and Cournot Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 16(3), pages 313-318, May.
- Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
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Keywords
economic equilibrium ; strategies ; oligopolies;All these keywords.
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