Selling Multiple Items to a Unit-Demand Buyer via Automated Mechanism Design
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2025-03-24 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DES-2025-03-24 (Economic Design)
- NEP-MIC-2025-03-24 (Microeconomics)
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