Beyond the Median Voter Theorem: A New Framework for Ideological Positioning
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2025-03-17 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2025-03-17 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2025-03-17 (Positive Political Economics)
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