The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
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NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2025-02-17 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-DES-2025-02-17 (Economic Design)
- NEP-UPT-2025-02-17 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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