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Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, State-Salient Decision Rules and the Strict Condorcet Choice Function

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  • Somdeb Lahiri

Abstract

We present a simple proof of a well-known axiomatic characterization of state-salient decision rules, using Weak Dominance Criterion and Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Subsequently we provide a simple axiomatic characterization of the Strict-Condorcet choice function on the domain of all preference profiles that have a strict-Condorcet winner, assuming that if the first two ranks are occupied by the same two alternatives in all states of nature, then the chosen alternative will be the one from these two that is preferred to the other with probability greater than half-provided such an alternative exists. We also show that this result is not valid if we extend the domain to the set of all preference profiles that have a unique weak-Condorcet winner.

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  • Somdeb Lahiri, 2025. "Global Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, State-Salient Decision Rules and the Strict Condorcet Choice Function," Papers 2501.10986, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2501.10986
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Denicolo, Vincenzo, 1985. "Independent social choice correspondences are dictatorial," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 9-12.
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    3. Pattanaik, Prasanta K, 1970. "Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of a Choice Set Under Majority Voting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 165-170, January.
    4. Donald E. Campbell & Jerry S. Kelly, 2003. "A strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 557-568, October.
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