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M6 Investment Challenge: The Role of Luck and Strategic Considerations

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  • Filip Stanv{e}k

Abstract

This article investigates the influence of luck and strategic considerations on performance of teams participating in the M6 investment challenge. We find that there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the extreme Sharpe ratios observed are beyond what one would expect by chance, given the number of teams, and thus not necessarily indicative of the possibility of consistently attaining abnormal returns. Furthermore, we introduce a stylized model of the competition to derive and analyze a portfolio strategy optimized for attaining the top rank. The results demonstrate that the task of achieving the top rank is not necessarily identical to that of attaining the best investment returns in expectation. It is possible to improve one's chances of winning, even without the ability to attain abnormal returns, by choosing portfolio weights adversarially based on the current competition ranking. Empirical analysis of submitted portfolio weights aligns with this finding.

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  • Filip Stanv{e}k, 2024. "M6 Investment Challenge: The Role of Luck and Strategic Considerations," Papers 2412.04490, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2412.04490
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