Procompetitive effects of vertical takeovers. Evidence from the European Union

Rising market power threatens competition and decreases consumers' welfare. To date, a few works have shown how global firm-level markups increase, but there is scant evidence about the channels of such a change. This study investigates the causal impact of takeovers on markups and related firm-level outcomes on European manufacturing in 2007- 2021. Interestingly, findings suggest that takeovers aimed at vertical integration strategies are procompetitive because they result in lower markups (0.7%) and more sales (2.9%). The effects are higher as time passes from the takeover event, and they increase with the parents' number of already integrated subsidiaries. Notably, we do not find a significant impact on markups in horizontal integration strategies after we control for cherry-picking by acquirers. Eventually, we emphasize that our results on vertical takeovers point to strategies aimed at eliminating double profit margins on the input markets; thus, lower markups increase sales, spreading fixed costs and benefiting from economies of scale. Several checks on methods and sample composition effects confirm our central tenets. Finally, we reconnect with the debate initiated by the U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines (2020; 2023), where the presumption of harm after vertical deals has been softened, thus considering procompetitive effects, but the discussion of potential foreclosure risks has been expanded.