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Disagreement Spillovers

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  • Giampaolo Bonomi

Abstract

As US political party leaders increasingly take stances both on economic and cultural (i.e., social policy) issues, the economic views of opposite cultural groups are growing apart. This paper explores a novel explanation for this phenomenon. I provide experimental evidence that adding social policy content to a policy message pushes those disagreeing with the social policy to disagree also with the economic content of the message. As my results suggest regular deviations from Bayesian explanations, I propose a model of identity-based belief updating that predicts the main regularities found in the experiment. Finally, I shed light on opinion leaders' incentives to strengthen the association between social policy and economic policy views.

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  • Giampaolo Bonomi, 2024. "Disagreement Spillovers," Papers 2411.11186, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2411.11186
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    References listed on IDEAS

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