IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arx/papers/2408.05701.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Why Groups Matter: Necessity of Group Structures in Attributions

Author

Listed:
  • Dangxing Chen
  • Jingfeng Chen
  • Weicheng Ye

Abstract

Explainable machine learning methods have been accompanied by substantial development. Despite their success, the existing approaches focus more on the general framework with no prior domain expertise. High-stakes financial sectors have extensive domain knowledge of the features. Hence, it is expected that explanations of models will be consistent with domain knowledge to ensure conceptual soundness. In this work, we study the group structures of features that are naturally formed in the financial dataset. Our study shows the importance of considering group structures that conform to the regulations. When group structures are present, direct applications of explainable machine learning methods, such as Shapley values and Integrated Gradients, may not provide consistent explanations; alternatively, group versions of the Shapley value can provide consistent explanations. We contain detailed examples to concentrate on the practical perspective of our framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Dangxing Chen & Jingfeng Chen & Weicheng Ye, 2024. "Why Groups Matter: Necessity of Group Structures in Attributions," Papers 2408.05701, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.05701
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.05701
    File Function: Latest version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Friedman, Eric & Moulin, Herve, 1999. "Three Methods to Share Joint Costs or Surplus," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 275-312, August.
    2. Haim Shalit, 2021. "The Shapley value decomposition of optimal portfolios," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-25, March.
    3. Yoshio Kamijo, 2009. "A Two-Step Shapley Value For Cooperative Games With Coalition Structures," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 11(02), pages 207-214.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Guang Zhang & Erfang Shan & Liying Kang & Yanxia Dong, 2017. "Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on $$\tau $$ τ -values," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 462-482, August.
    2. Dangxing Chen, 2023. "Can I Trust the Explanations? Investigating Explainable Machine Learning Methods for Monotonic Models," Papers 2309.13246, arXiv.org.
    3. Yves Sprumont, 2010. "An Axiomatization of the Serial Cost-Sharing Method," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1711-1748, September.
    4. Juarez, Ruben & Ko, Chiu Yu & Xue, Jingyi, 2018. "Sharing sequential values in a network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 734-779.
    5. Hervé Moulin & Yves Sprumont, 2007. "Fair allocation of production externalities : recent results," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 117(1), pages 7-36.
    6. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tind, Jørgen, 2009. "Cost allocation and convex data envelopment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 194(3), pages 939-947, May.
    7. van den Brink, René & Khmelnitskaya, Anna & van der Laan, Gerard, 2012. "An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 786-789.
    8. Sylvain Béal & Anna Khmelnitskaya & Philippe Solal, 2018. "Two-step values for games with two-level communication structure," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 563-587, February.
    9. Yoshio Kamijo, 2013. "The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 21(3), pages 572-589, October.
    10. Koster, M.A.L., 1998. "Multi-Service Serial Cost Sharing : A Characterization of the Moulin-Shenker Rule," Discussion Paper 1998-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Silvia Lorenzo-Freire, 2017. "New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf–Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(3), pages 579-600, October.
    12. Friedman, Eric J., 2012. "Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 139-151.
    13. Robert John Kolesar & Peter Bogetoft & Vanara Chea & Guido Erreygers & Sambo Pheakdey, 2022. "Advancing universal health coverage in the COVID-19 era: an assessment of public health services technical efficiency and applied cost allocation in Cambodia," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-20, December.
    14. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 98-110.
    15. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2018. "Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 737-765, September.
    16. Haim Shalit, 2024. "The Nonsense of Bitcoin 1n Portfolio Analysis," Working Papers 2401, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    17. Friedman, Eric J., 2002. "Strategic properties of heterogeneous serial cost sharing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 145-154, November.
    18. Chen, Yan, 2003. "An experimental study of serial and average cost pricing mechanisms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2305-2335, September.
    19. Watts, Alison, 2002. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in cost sharing games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 47-70, February.
    20. Wang, Yun-Tong & Zhu, Daxin, 2002. "Ordinal proportional cost sharing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 215-230, May.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.05701. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: arXiv administrators (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://arxiv.org/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.