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Optimal Order Execution subject to Reservation Strategies under Execution Risk

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  • Xue Cheng
  • Peng Guo
  • Tai-ho Wang

Abstract

The paper addresses the problem of meta order execution from a broker-dealer's point of view in Almgren-Chriss model under order fill uncertainty. A broker-dealer agency is authorized to execute an order of trading on client's behalf. The strategies that the agent is allowed to deploy is subject to a benchmark, referred to as the reservation strategy, regulated by the client. We formulate the broker's problem as a utility maximization problem in which the broker seeks to maximize his utility of excess profit-and-loss at the execution horizon. Optimal strategy in feedback form is obtained in closed form. In the absence of execution risk, the optimal strategies subject to reservation strategies are deterministic. We establish an affine structure among the trading trajectories under optimal strategies subject to general reservation strategies using implementation shortfall and target close orders as basis. We conclude the paper with numerical experiments illustrating the trading trajectories as well as histograms of terminal wealth and utility at investment horizon under optimal strategies versus those under TWAP strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Xue Cheng & Peng Guo & Tai-ho Wang, 2024. "Optimal Order Execution subject to Reservation Strategies under Execution Risk," Papers 2401.03305, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2401.03305
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2401.03305
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    Cited by:

    1. Yufan Chen & Lan Wu & Renyuan Xu & Ruixun Zhang, 2024. "Periodic Trading Activities in Financial Markets: Mean-field Liquidation Game with Major-Minor Players," Papers 2408.09505, arXiv.org.

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